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ABSTRACT
The remarkable philosophical present-day turn to Paul pays a lot
of attention to the particular role played by the famous distinc-
tions that structure Paul’s rhetoric such as the distinction between
faith and law, life and death, and spirit and ﬂesh. These distinc-
tions lead to the question of whether Paul (or the philosophers’
Paul) endorses a dualism or not. In this essay, the author investi-
gates Badiou’s and Agamben’s readings of Paul and asks whether
one cannot ﬁnd a form of dialectics rather than dualism in these
readings. The concept of the exception seems to corroborate this
suggestion. To examine whether this suggestion makes sense, the
author ﬁrst discusses Badiou’s focus on the antidialectics of death
and resurrection as well as the dialectical remnants in Badiou’s
reading of Paul. Subsequently, the author analyses Agamben’s
dialectical account of the Pauline terms katargein (to deactivate),
chrēsis (use) and charis (grace).
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1. Introduction: dualism or dialectics?
In an intriguing comment in Saint Paul, Alain Badiou suspends, if only for one
moment, his critical attitude to the work of Martin Heidegger. He suggests that the
latter’s notion of onto-theology captures what is truly at stake in the present-day
philosophical turn to Paul:
One must, in Paul’s logic, go so far as to say that the Christ-event testiﬁes that God is not
the god of Being, is not Being. Paul prescribes an anticipatory critique of what Heidegger
calls onto-theology, wherein God is thought as supreme being, and hence as the measure
for what being as such is capable of1.
For Paul, as Badiou suggests, the heart of the matter is the proclamation that God is not
the God of onto-theology. The latter God is described as ‘supreme being’ and as ‘the
measure for what being as such is capable of.’ Paul’s God, by contrast, concerns
something that being – or in Paul’s vocabulary of 1 Corinthians, the present form of
the world, to schēma tou kosmou toutou (1 Cor. 7:31) – is not capable of. Badiou names
this ‘something’ the event. In Paul’s case, he speaks of the Christ-event, the resurrection.
We need not agree with Badiou’s speciﬁc speculative framework of being and event to
be intrigued by the thrust of his analysis and to see that it is characteristic of at least one
basic motive in the present-day philosophical turn to Paul’s letter: Paul’s proclamation
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is concerned with something the present world is not capable of and which is an
exception to the present form of the world (to schēma tou kosmou toutou; 1 Cor. 7:31).2
Simon Critchley argues that this motive is part of a ‘meontology’ at the heart of the
Paul-readings of Heidegger, Badiou, and Agamben.3 To a certain extent, the name
‘meontology’ is quite aptly chosen: Badiou’s above quote is part of a comment on 1
Corinthians 1 in which God and the exception are indeed concerned with ta mē onta
rather than ta onta: ‘God chose what is base and despised in the world, and even things
that are not (ta mē onta), to bring to nought (katargeō) things that are (ta onta) ….’4 In
this verse, Paul proclaims that the things that are not, ta mē onta – i.e. the things that
are considered to be of no value in the world – are as chosen by God over the things
that are, ta onta. If this passage supports the idea of Paul’s anticipatory critique of onto-
theology, should one not argue that Paul’s alternative is indeed a meontology – an
ontology that departs from what is not(hing)? Critchley connects this philosophical
preference for what is not to the Gnostic or Marcionic temptation that lures Paul’s
letter. By emphasizing those passages in which Paul prefers what is not over what
actually is in our earthly world, the philosophers give in to this temptation.5 It would
not be diﬃcult to see in such an analysis a repetition of Nietzsche’s claim that the
Christianity founded by Paul is nihilistic to its core. The term ‘meontology’ suggests as
much. Moreover, it implies that the famous distinctions that structure Paul’s rhetoric –
pistis versus nomos or faith versus law, zōē versus thanatos or life versus death, and
pneuma versus sarx or spirit versus ﬂesh – express a distinct dualism. Following
Nietzsche’s analysis, this dualism is a nihilism: it is introduced so that the actual
world can be rejected.6
Yet, what such a reading forgets is that the rejection of the world need not
necessarily be without qualiﬁcation. It might be a qualiﬁed rejection. Taubes under-
stands Paul’s struggle in exactly this way: ‘And it’s a diﬀerent matter whether one
decides, in whatever way, to understand the cosmos as immanent and governed by laws,
or whether one thinks the miracle is possible, the exception.’7 Instead of another world,
Taubes argues that Paul is concerned with an exception and its possibility. An exception
is never without relation to what it is the exception to. Given the philosophical heritage
of this notion, one might expect that a reﬂection on Paul that stresses this sense of the
exception adopts a speciﬁc dialectical for, rather than a dualist one. It is the goal of the
present article to examine whether it makes sense to consider Badiou’s and Agamben’s
philosophical readings of Paul in terms of a dialectics of the exception rather than as a
dualism or a meontology: in terms of the oppositions mentioned above, this would
imply that, for instance, pistis would thus not appear as the mere opposite of nomos, but
in its distinction with nomos it would appear as an exception and a surplus to nomos.
My examination is thus inspired by the hypothesis that the fundamental distinctions at
work in Paul’s letters attest to a more complicated, dialectical structure rather than a
sheer dualist one.
I have chosen Badiou and Agamben because their readings go in diﬀerent directions
exactly concerning the question of Paul’s dialectics.8 In fact, it is even rather doubtful
whether we can ﬁnd a dialectics at all in Badiou’s reading given his straightforward
rejection of dialectics in his emphasis on the ‘antidialectic of death and resurrection.’9
Moreover, both Agamben and Badiou problematize, albeit in diﬀerent ways, any
attempt to seek Paul’s alternative to dualism in a Hegelian dialectics.10 This heritage
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of Paul’s alternative to a Hegelian dialectics does not only mark their readings of Paul
but also strongly mark their work after their respective readings of Paul.
2. Paul’s antidialectics and the exception
For Badiou, the Christ-event of the resurrection is an exception to what he terms the
situation in which Paul lives. The ta onta, the things that are, refer in the ﬁrst place
to those elements that make up the situation, such as the Roman legal order of the
world, the form of the cosmos in which Paul lives, and the particular identities or
discourses in this situation, which Badiou identiﬁes by the two names of Jew and
Greek. It is in this situation that Paul proclaims an exception. Badiou’s comments on
dialectics and antidialectics in Paul are no asides but belong to the core of his
reﬂection on the (non-)relation of situation and event. Let us therefore consider
some of the basic passages in which he speaks on this issue and rejects the dialectical
Paul.
First, when Badiou argues that Paul’s conversion should not be understood as a
‘dialectical reversal’ but rather as a ‘thunderbolt’ and ‘caesura,’ he aims to show that this
conversion (like the event to which it is faithful), cannot be understood as dialectical
negation of Paul’s past, the particular circumstances of his Jewishness or his past as
Pharisee. As Badiou writes: ‘Just as the Resurrection remains totally incalculable and it
is from there that one must begin, Paul’s faith is that from which he begins as a subject,
and nothing leads up to it.’11 Both faith and event are ex nihilo and truly new – but
both of these terms have to be read in relation to the situation. There is nothing in the
situation which can account for either the resurrection or Paul’s faith. Both of them are
pure grace. The dismissal of the term ‘dialectical’ shows that apparently for Badiou
there is a danger in conceiving of event and faith in terms of dialectics because it would
make them the dialectical consequence of the old. This also shows that Badiou’s usage of
the word dialectics is determined by its Hegelian sense in which the dialectical process
of negation and negation of the negation realizes new levels in reality. That it is indeed
this concern for the newness of the event and the subject that inspires Badiou’s
dismissal of the term ‘dialectics,’ is aﬃrmed by other examples.
Second, when invoking Paul’s dispute with the ‘Judea-Christian faction,’ that is, with
the faction that thinks that the rituals of Judaism are also of importance in the Christian
communities, Badiou describes this faction as follows: ‘Its conception of the subject is
dialectical. It is not a question of denying the power of the event. It is a question of
asserting that its novelty conserves and sublates the traditional site of faith, that it
incorporates it by exceeding it.’12 The problem with the Judea-Christian faction is not
that it denies the resurrection but rather that it conceives of it dialectically. The quote
speciﬁes dialectics in terms of Hegel’s Aufhebung, that is, as the movement that
conserves and sublates the old and thus constitutes the new. The type of newness
that the Hegelian dialectic logic allows us to think, expressed in the quote by ‘exceeding
it,’ is not enough to capture the newness as pure indiﬀerence to the old.13 This
indiﬀerence to the old social relations and customs does not only show that the event
does not give them a new meaning but also that the event and the subject cannot be
bothered to annihilate the old structures. If there is a nihilism in Paul, it is not
concerned with destruction but rather with indiﬀerence to what is.14
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Third, one should also understand Badiou’s insistence on the antidialectics of the
resurrection in these terms. Once more, it is Hegel’s version of dialectics to which
antidialectics is opposed. Referring to Hegel’s account of the resurrection as the result
of a dialectical process in which life is ﬁrst negated in death and subsequently overcome
by the subsequent negation of death in a synthesis of both life and death, Badiou insists
that the resurrection in Paul’s letters is devoid of any reference to the gospels’ narration
of the passion of the Christ. Paul does not oﬀer such a dialectical relation to Christ’s
history in his account of the resurrection. Consequently, death, suﬀering, or martyrdom
do not add anything to the event of the resurrection. By contrast, a dialectic conception
of the resurrection would lead to the conclusion that death and suﬀering ‘possess an
intrinsically redemptive function,’ as Badiou writes, ‘which, it has to be said, corre-
sponds to a Christian imagery that has been omnipresent for centuries.’15 For Badiou’s
Paul, life and death are not connected in any organic, dialectical unity, but opposed to
each other as two diﬀerent modes of living, as the path of spirit and the path of ﬂesh.
Thus, these terms are but names for the two diﬀerent attitudes to the resurrection.
Whereas faith, life, and spirit name the ﬁdelity to the resurrection, law, death, and ﬂesh
name the human refusal to be faithful to the event.
The fourth and last example of Paul’s antidialectics can be found in the conclusion of
Saint Paul. There, Badiou writes:
Paul, we have insisted, is not a dialectician. The universal is not the negation of particu-
larity. It is the measured advance across a distance relative to perpetually subsisting
particularity. Every particularity is a conformation, a conformism. It is a question of
maintaining a nonconformity with regard to that which is always conforming us. … Far
from ﬂeeing from the century, one must live with it, but without letting oneself be shaped,
conformed. … Only what is in immanent exception is universal.16
Once more, Badiou explains dialectics in terms of negation. For Paul, the universal is
not the negation of the particular, that is, the universal is not brought into being out of
a process in which the particular plays a role. Thus, we see that the Hegelian scheme is
crossed out as a model to understand Paul.
Does this not imply that it makes no sense to speak of dialectics in the case of
Badiou? Strictly speaking, it only means that it makes no sense to speak of a Hegelian
dialectics. Hence, there is some space for other forms of dialectics. This is why we have
to return to the above quote because it is not only a summary of what we already
discussed above but also it oﬀers a number of other indications. They show that
Badiou’s alternative to dialectics is more complex than the terms that we have oﬀered
so far to explain it and that may very well ﬁt in with a dualism (namely the terms
‘indiﬀerence’ and ‘antidialectics’). First, he writes that particularities will always subsist
as indiﬀerent particularities. As soon as we realize that the notion of the law represents
for Badiou a particularity – it is the law of a people, a tradition, a nation – we see that
the usual connection between universal and law is broken in this quote. Particularity
means for Badiou conformism and identiﬁcation with the existing social structures
expressed in and defended by the law. Second, the universal is understood as ‘immanent
exception,’ which in this quote refers to a mode of living that does not ﬂee away from
the present in which we live, but rather lives in the present in a particular way.
Exception thus corresponds to an attitude of nonconformity.
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By introducing the concept of the exception, Badiou complicates his account of
Paul’s antidialectics, although he does not address this speciﬁc complication in his
argumentation. Basically, this complication consists in the fact that an exception is
always a dialectical relation in which a rule, law, or universal is presupposed with
respect to which the exception is an exception. In order to explicate how this peculiar
relation plays a role in Badiou’s Saint Paul, I will proceed in three steps.
(1) First, although one might be tempted to argue that what Badiou calls anti-
dialectics is simply a form of dualism – of event and situation, of spirit and ﬂesh,
and so on – it is important to see in which sense Paul’s antidialectics is, for Badiou,
not another version of the dualism and nihilism that Nietzsche so heavily criticized
in Paul. Badiou quotes the passage of § 42 of The Antichrist, § 42, where Nietzsche
writes:
Paul simply shifted the centre of gravity of that entire existence beyond this existence –
into the lie of the ‘resurrected’ Jesus. In fact, he could make no use at all of the redeemer’s
life – he needed the death on the Cross and something in addition.17
For Nietzsche, the resurrection belongs to the surreal, to what does not belong to the
existence proper. Paul, in Nietzsche’s account, has no interest in Christ’s life, but only
in his death and ‘something in addition,’ that is, the lie of the resurrection. We have
already noted that for Badiou the non-reference to Christ’s life is part of the proof that
Paul’s account of Christ’s resurrection is not dialectical. Yet, this argument alone can
very well be interpreted in line with Nietzsche’s idea of Paul’s nihilism. Therefore,
Badiou adds that the resurrection is not so much concerned with something beyond
this existence. Rather, resurrection is the name for an intensiﬁcation of life, here and
now. Resurrection is not only concerned with the resurrection of the Christ but also
with the believers who are resurrected to a new form of life with Christ. To indicate the
similarity between Nietzsche’s and Paul’s project, Badiou refers to Nietzsche’s
Übermensch when he calls this intensiﬁcation of life surexistence or ‘overexistence.’18
Contradicting Nietzsche’s claim that Paul would be concerned with an (illusionary)
existence beyond this existence and puts ‘the centre of gravity beyond this existence,’
Badiou insists that the diﬀerence between the paths of the spirit and of the ﬂesh can
only be understood if we see that it concerns existence here and now: ‘for [Paul] it is
here and now that life takes revenges on death, here and now that we can live
aﬃrmatively, according to the spirit, rather than negatively, according to the ﬂesh,
which is the thought of death.’19 Thus, the exception is not concerned with something
beyond existence, but with ‘overexistence.’
(2) Second, it is not surprising that these remarks on Nietzsche are found in a
chapter entitled ‘the division of the subject,’ a theme which is also highly signiﬁcant in
the following chapter entitled ‘the antidialectic of the resurrection.’ The subject is
marked by a division because the subject, on the one hand, is part of the situation
and its particular identities and, on the other hand, is called on by the event that
transcends these identities. For Badiou, this division is contrasted to the undivided
ﬁgure of subjectivity represented by the particular (collective) identities of Jew or Greek.
These collective identities and their particular discourse ‘lay claim to the perpetuation
of a full or undivided subject, whose particular predicates it would be possible to
enumerate: genealogy, origin, territory, rituals, and so on.’20
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It is the division of the subject that explains why the event comes equipped with two
paths. One might perhaps say that the event is, for the subject, its bifurcation point in
which the unitary ﬁgure oﬀered by its communal identity bifurcates into two diﬀerent
paths: one of the ﬂesh, which adheres to this communal identity and which becomes the
path of death only in and through the event (since, after all, without the event the
communal identity is the only available one in Badiou’s logic), and one of the spirit ‘as
ﬁdelity to the event,’ that is, ﬁdelity to the exception to particular identities.21
(3) Third, this means that for the subject there actually is a certain dialectics at work
here: the particularities are there in the subject as suspended. It is intriguing to see that
the ﬁnal sentences of Badiou’s chapter on Paul’s antidialectics conﬁrm this other hidden
form of dialectics:
However, although resurrection is not the ‘Calvary of the Absolute,’ although it mobilizes
no dialectic of the incarnation of Spirit, it is nevertheless true that it suspends [relève]
diﬀerences for the beneﬁt of a radical universality, and that the event is addressed to all
without exception, or deﬁnitively divides every subject.22
The noun relève of the verb relever, which Badiou chooses here and that is translated as
‘to suspend,’ is Derrida’s famous suggestion to translate Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung
and the accompanying verb aufheben.23 To read in Badiou’s usage of this verb, a
transformed version of this dialectical relation is, given the structure of Badiou’s
sentence, not too far-fetched. In fact, one might say that the path of spirit, that is, the
path of a persevering ﬁdelity to the event is nothing but a continuous eﬀort on the part
of the subject to suspend the diﬀerences that mark it, so that it is indeed faithful to what
is an exception to the structure of particular diﬀerences.
This eﬀort or work that takes place in and by the subject to suspend diﬀerences is
most clearly visible in another Pauline structure that reﬂects a non-Hegelian dialectical
relation. In reference to Romans 6:14, where Paul writes ‘for you are not under the law,
but under grace,’ Badiou interrogates the ‘not …, but …’ that structures this passage.
For him, this structure mirrors the two paths open to the subject (since he identiﬁes law
with death and ﬂesh and he places grace on the same level as faith, life, and spirit).24
The negation of the law, expressed by the ‘not …,’ is once more described as a
suspension (this time in the original: suspense and suspendu) of the path of the
ﬂesh. Second, the supplementary ‘but …’ refers to the path of the spirit. These two
aspects mark the very division of the subject, as Badiou writes:
The subject of the new epoch is a ‘not … but.’ The event is at once the suspension of the
path of the ﬂesh through a problematic ‘not,’ and the aﬃrmation of the path of the spirit
through a ‘but’ of exception. Law and grace are for the subject the name of the constituting
weave through which he is related to the situation as it is and to the eﬀects of the event as
they have to become.25
The suspension of the diﬀerences is thus supplemented by the exception as grace: the
suspension of the ‘not’ encounters in the ‘but’ an unexpected and unforeseen grace that
cannot be accounted for in terms of the negation or the suspension of the diﬀerences as
such, but which is also not unrelated to it. Thus, this suspension is not a Hegelian
Aufhebung because this suspension is not productive in the way Hegel’s Aufhebung is;
grace is the exception and the properly positive and productive moment in this
structure that oﬀers to the subject the possibility of faith and ﬁdelity. Thus, the subject
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always remains marked by a tension, an immanent dialectical battle in which the two
sides are never reconciled.
Combining these three steps by which Badiou’s account of Paul’s antidialectics is
complicated by a sense of the ‘immanent exception,’ let us consider the following quote
from Badiou’s Saint Paul that summarizes, ﬁrst, how this antidialectics opposes Hegel’s
dialectics and, second, how the exception introduces another version of dialectics that
we will develop further in discussion of Agamben’s reading of Paul:
I shall maintain that Paul’s position is antidialectical, and that for it death is in no way the
obligatory exercise of the negative’s immanent power. Grace, consequently, is not a
‘moment’ of the Absolute. It is aﬃrmation without preliminary negation; it is what
comes upon us in caesura of the law. It is pure and simple encounter.26
Once more, we see that the ‘immanent power’ of the negative is not the driving force in
Paul’s thought. Moreover, the opposition between grace and death is not taken up in a
reconciliation. In exactly this sense, this opposition is not dialectical in a Hegelian
sense: grace is not a moment of the Absolute, as Badiou writes, since such an account
would imply the ultimate identity of grace and death in the Absolute. Instead, grace is a
positivity or an incalculable, non-derivable surplus with respect to death and its
negation. At the same time, grace happens in and as the interruption of the law: the
negation of the law is the site where the encounter with this surplus is to be found. By
describing grace as ‘pure and simple encounter,’ Badiou suggests that we are dealing
here not so much with a Hegelian dialectic, but rather with one in which the moment is
not the moment in a more general dialectical development, but in which it is rather the
intensiﬁed present of a dialectical battle. In this battle, the exception aﬃrms itself in the
subject in its opposition to what is called death, law, and ﬂesh in Paul’s letters.
If we return to our introductory concerns about the meontological nature of the
present-day turn to Paul, we now know better of how the emphasis on the nothing
should and should not be understood in the case of Badiou. When he quotes Paul that
the things that are, are brought to nothing, this does not mean that they are annihilated
or destroyed and it also does not mean that Badiou prefers the things that are merely
not over the things that are. Rather, the things that are and the reigning discourses that
determine the place, law, and meaning of the things that are, are confronted and
repositioned by the exception. One might say that Badiou repeats Kierkegaard’s aﬃr-
mation of the exception as he does in Repetition: ‘There are exceptions.’27 This
aﬃrmation, as Kierkegaard demonstrates, implies a dialectical battle between what he
calls the universal and the exception: every attempt of the universal to subsume the
exception under its reign, fails in this battle and thus the attempt of the abstract
universal to become concrete fails, but this failure is nothing but the encounter with
the resistance and the nonconformity of the exception.28 In this Kierkegaardian frame-
work, the encounter with the exception is not a moment in a more encompassing
development of the Absolute, but rather the intensiﬁed present itself in which the
exception aﬃrms itself as exception. With such a framework in mind, the claim that
readings such as Badiou’s are basically meontological, gnostic, or Marcionist, is actually
claiming that the exception is simply nothing and belongs to another world – and this is
identical to claiming that, in Badiou’s vocabulary, the discourses that mark the present
situation, are indeed all there is. The whole point, however, is that the things that are
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not and that are chosen by God are not nothing; they are of the order of the exception:
they are not of another time, another existence or another world; they are immanent
exceptions and are in need of the present, of the here and now, as the time of their
aﬃrmation, as the time to show what the exception, in contrast to the world and its
discourses and laws, is capable of.
That it makes sense to speak of a dialectics of the exception might not be so
straightforward in light of Badiou’s Saint Paul, which belongs systematically to the
period of Being and Time in which he prefers to describe his own thought as an
antidialectic, to emphasize the diﬀerence with Hegel. Yet, it becomes more convincing
when seen in light of Badiou’s own development. In Logics of Worlds, he does adopt the
term ‘dialectic’ for his own position: he describes it as ‘materialist dialectic.’ The
characteristic statement that captures this dialectic point of view is the following:
It is then legitimate to counter democratic materialism – this sovereignty of the Two
(bodies and languages) – with a materialist dialectic, if by ‘materialist dialectic’ we under-
stand the following statement, in which the Three supplements the reality of the Two:
There are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths.
…
It’s worth paying attention to the syntax, which sets the axiom of the materialist dialectic
apart from that of democratic materialism – namely the ‘except that.’29
The English translation of sinon que as ‘except that’ is even more favorable to my
argument than the French original. It shows in its wording how the notion of the
exception – here formulated in Badiou’s concept of truth – marks his version of
dialectics. The exception marked by the sinon que is the third term, next to bodies
and languages, that constitutes the dialectic par excellence for Badiou.
In a recent text on ‘aﬃrmative dialectics,’ Badiou connects this new appraisal of
dialectics to his reading of Paul and makes clear that, indeed, his insistence on the
antidialectic or ‘non-dialectical’ Paul is meant in the ﬁrst place as dismissal of Hegel’s
version of dialectics, and he repeats that he is still in agreement with his old self.30 Yet,
this dismissal also opens up the possibility of another version of dialectics in which the
negation is not productive, as in Hegel, but is rather to be understood in light of a
preceding aﬃrmation.31 In terms of his Saint Paul, he describes this preceding aﬃrma-
tion and its relation to negation as follows:
you create something absolutely new [Paul’s event, GJvdH], not in the form of a negation
of what exists but in the form of the newness inside of what exists. And so we no longer
have negation, on the one hand, and aﬃrmation, on the other. Instead, there is aﬃrmation
and division, or the creation that grounds the independence of new subject from within
the situation of the old.32
Negation is thus not the engine of development and change but rather the derivative
and consequence of a preceding aﬃrmation. This relation between negation and
aﬃrmation is seen in the structure of the division of the subject, as Badiou aﬃrms
here once more. As discussed above, this division is the subject’s struggle and negation
of the ‘situation of the old’ from which it stems.33 These later reﬂections on dialectics
show, ﬁrst, that Badiou acknowledges that his antidialectic from Saint Paul can be
understood and, in fact, need to be understood, in terms of a dialectics of the exception.
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And, second, they show that his reading of Paul oﬀers the exemplary example of this
dialectics.
3. Paul’s exception and suspension
The reference to Kierkegaard in the previous section does not only help us to under-
stand Badiou’s work in terms of dialectics but also allows us to move forward to
Agamben. The passages on the exception from Repetition are famously quoted by
Carl Schmitt and, via him, found its way into the present-day philosophical discussion
on Paul and in particular into Taubes’ The Political Theology of Paul and Agamben’s
The Time That Remains.34 In light of the discussion we are engaged in this essay, this
reference to the exception is of crucial importance. The exception is not what lies
beyond this world. With respect to the exception, the basic question is whether it has
the possibility to aﬃrm and manifest itself in this world, as an immanent exception of
the world. The exception oﬀers something that the world as such is incapable of and
which therefore deserves the name of grace. In relation to the exception, we get a better
view of the logic of nothingness and the things that are not that Paul develops in his
letters. What is considered nothing from the viewpoint of the world is, fact, not nothing
but rather an exception. This is the primary meaning of Paul’s alleged ‘nihilism’: the
ﬁrst nothing we encounter is of a world that does not allow the exception to exist. The
world’s ‘there are no exceptions’ is the ﬁrst negation that tries to negate the exception.
Out of this negation, the other ones are born: when Paul writes that the world is coming
to nothing and identiﬁes himself with the refuse of the world, these are qualiﬁed and
determined negations. They mean that the present form of the world is nothing but
only insofar as it considers the exception to be nothing and insofar as it does not count
with the exception. For Paul, world and exception are thus engaged in a dialectical
battle to aﬃrm and assert the existence of the exception.
Whereas Badiou’s account of this battle is located in the subject, which sometimes
gives the impression that he leaves the dualism of situation and event somewhat
unresolved, Agamben’s reading of Paul oﬀers a more elaborate version of the type of
non-Hegelian dialectics of the exception that one may encounter in Paul.35 It might be
tempting at this point to engage with Agamben’s extensively discussed and heavily
debated interpretation of Schmitt’s state of exception, through which Agamben some-
how adopts Kierkegaard’s notion of the exception, but I will take another route in order
to focus fully on the question of a dialectics in Paul. Against the background of our
reading of Badiou, I will bring out three notions in Agamben’s reading, (1) katargein,
(2) chrēsis, and (3) charis, in order to show how Agamben’s reading of Paul leads to a
real dialectics of the exception. Especially the ﬁrst two notions are core concepts in
other works of Agamben as well.
(1) Katargein. To this end, I will ﬁrst turn to 1 Corinthians 1:28, which is not only
the source of inspiration for the name ‘meontology’ but also plays a basic role in
Badiou’s conception of Paul as we have seen. Yet, there is one aspect of this verse
that we did not discuss. Paul uses a particular verb, katargein, to express what happens
to the things that are, and this verb is translated as ‘to bring to nought.’ It is Agamben
who draws our attention to the importance of the verb katargein and its noun
katargēsis.36 Whereas the translation ‘to bring to nought’ might remind us of ‘to
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annihilate,’ ‘to destruct,’ or ‘to reduce to nothing,’ Agamben argues that it actually
means ‘to render inoperative.’37 As he points out, katargein is not the antonym of poiein
but rather of energein, so it is not a form of destruction but as the antonym of to
activate, to realize (as in the German verwirklichen), or to be at work, it means to
deactivate, to derealize and to suspend.38 To deactivate a machine or to render
inoperative a law is not the same as destroying them; it is rather an operation by
which the machine no longer functions as it is supposed to function and the law no
longer applies as it usually applies. If we carry this meaning of katargein over to 1
Corinthians 1:28, we see that the katargēsis of the things that are, captures the sense of
the secondary expressions that Paul uses to account for the nothingness of the form of
the world and the things that are. The type of nothingness is a deactivation and its goal
is clear: to deactivate and suspend the primary world’s declarations of the nothingness
of the exception so that the exception may aﬃrm itself. This suspension shows that the
present order of the world is not a necessary one. There is room for the possibility of an
exception to the laws and values of which this order is composed. Thus, read in light of
Agamben’s account of katargein, the discussion in 1 Corinthians 1:28 is not about the
opposition between what is and what is not, but rather about a reinterpretation of to-be
-not(hing). In this sense, the reﬂection on katargein is part of philosophical problem
comparable to the one Plato addresses in the Sophist when reinterpreting being-nothing
as being-diﬀerent or being-otherwise and to the one Aristotle addresses in the
Metaphysics when reinterpreting being-nothing as being-potential (dunamis). Both
Plato and Aristotle distinguish these forms of being-nothing from sheer nothingness.
Katargēsis belongs to this group of philosophical concepts, such as the Other and
potentiality, that show how the suspension of what counts as being (as being-
identical or being-the-same and being-actual) gives space to the exception to these
modes of being so that it can now show itself to be not nothing.
To capture the dialectical lineage of katargein, Agamben argues that there is an
intrinsic link between Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung and Paul’s katargēsis, a link which
according to him is established by Luther’s translation of katargein as aufheben,
especially in Romans 3:31.39 This lineage concerns for Agamben the genealogy of the
Pauline katargein. In such a genealogy, one can not only ﬁnd certain kinships between
the meaning and the usage of the words involved but also encounter some crucial
diﬀerences. Especially in light of Badiou’s insistence on the antidialectics of Paul and
given the fact that Agamben responds to Badiou’s reading of Paul in his own reading,
this genealogy oﬀers a support as well as a critique of Badiou’s insistence on the
diﬀerence between Paul’s and Hegel’s dialectics. What Badiou fails to account for is
why Hegel’s interpretation of Christianity in terms of the dialectical scheme has always
been so successful, given that Paul is one of the founders of the intellectual and
theological heritage of Christianity: Badiou disagrees with Hegel. He acknowledges
that Hegel’s reading has been very successful, but he does not explain why Hegel’s
reading has been so successful. Hence, he can also not explain in which sense his
correction of Hegel can be seen as coming out of a genuine Pauline motive that Hegel
did not and perhaps could not have seen. So how would Agamben respond to these
issues?
The kinship between katargēsis and Aufhebung can be found in Agamben’s following
explication:
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In each case what is presupposed by the Aufhebung is that what has been lifted is not
completely eliminated, but rather persists somehow and can thus be preserved (Was sich
aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu Nichts, ‘What is sublated, is not thereby reduced to
nothing’ …).40
What both notions have in common is the not-being-reduced-to-nothing of, in the case
of katargēsis, the ta onta. As in Badiou’s subject, the things that are, the communal
identities and discourses, are somehow still preserved. Yet, Aufhebung implies that this
preservation is taken up in a new identity, a new unitary ﬁgure of the subject, and it is
exactly this aspect that Badiou rejects. Although Agamben might accept this latter
dimension of Badiou’s resistance to Hegel’s dialectics – we are indeed not dealing
with another identity similar to the preceding ones – his reading also suggests that he
would problematize the way in which Badiou treats this preservation. For Badiou’s
subject, the old identity is either that with which one ﬁghts in one’s eﬀort to remain
faithful to the Christ-event or that which is completely indiﬀerent in the new situation.
Yet, this twofold attitude towards given identities or callings does not properly explain,
for Agamben, in which sense these identities and callings are preserved in and given
back to the subject. In a certain sense, as one might reconstruct a debate between
Agamben and Badiou, Badiou remains too much on the side of the opposition: he
adheres to the opposition of the path of the spirit and the path of the ﬂesh according to
which given identities are to be fought against; and he adheres to the opposition of the
universal and the diﬀerences that do not matter for the universal. What Badiou does
not think is a third, dialectical term that establishes a new relation between the two
opposed terms. This is not a third term that encompasses and reconciles the other two,
but one that shows the fertility and usefulness of the deactivated identity and the
revoked vocation (klēsis).41
(2) Chrēsis. According to Agamben, Paul does oﬀer such a third term, namely chrēsis
or use: the old or given identities and vocations are not only fought against but by their
deactivation they are also given back to the subject for free use. In this sense, for
Agamben, the Pauline exception is not opposed to the old identities and vocations,
but is the very deactivation or katargēsis of these identities and vocations so that they
are given free to be used.42
Above, I have discussed Badiou’s attention to the ‘not …, but …’-structure. In a
certain sense, this structure reminds us of the hōs mē, ‘as not’-structure analyzed by
Agamben. This latter structure is used in 1 Corinthians 7 in which Paul writes that one
should be married as not being married, weep as not weeping and rejoice as not
rejoicing.43 The reason why the ‘not …, but …’-structure may remind us of the ‘as not’-
structure is due to one striking resemblance: both express the basic indiﬀerence of the
faithful ones to what is deemed signiﬁcant in the present form of the world and, at the
same time, both express the necessity of a battle to remain faithful to the exception and
not to conform to the present form of the world. Yet, for Agamben, these three terms –
opposition, battle, and indiﬀerence – do not capture the full sense of the hōs mē. This
tension (or ‘tensor’ as Agamben terms the ‘as not’ linguistically) ﬁnds its truth in a third
term that mediates the opposed terms. Again, the mediating term is ‘use’ since chrēsis is
the very deﬁnition of the mode of life expressed by hōs mē, as Agamben argues: ‘Use:
this is the deﬁnition Paul gives to messianic life in the form of the as not. To live
messianically means’ to use ‘klēsis; conversely, messianic klēsis is something to use, not
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to possess.’44 This quote beautifully demonstrates the distance to both Badiou and
Hegel; to Badiou because there is a third term besides law and grace that are put in
contrast by the ‘not …, but …,’; to Hegel because the third term is not a form of
appropriation but only of use.45 Thus, one may conclude, this form of dialectics does
not, as Hegel’s one aims to do, oﬀer a solution to the tension and the opposition by
appropriating the opposed terms in a higher unity. Yet, it also does not absolutize the
opposition or tension as Badiou runs the risk of doing. Rather, for Agamben, Paul’s
dialectics of the exception oﬀers a form of life: it is in human praxis as the use of
identities, discourses, and vocations that the tension of spirit and ﬂesh, of spirit and
letter is mediated, and the deactivation of the order of the world allows the world to
become a new creation. Bringing all these elements together in a very dense passage,
Agamben writes:
The hōs mē therefore does not only have a negative content; rather, for Paul, this is the
only possible use of worldly situations. The messianic vocation … is a generic potentiality
[potenza] that can be used without ever being owned … This expropriation does not,
however, found a new identity; the ‘new creature’ is none other than the use and messianic
vocation of the old.46
The ‘as not’ is not only the negativity of an opposition but also its positive content is
use, and this use does not derive from an ownership or an identity but from the
messianic vocation, which is the revocation of every vocation, that is, an expropriation
of our identity and our property (or properties). This messianic vocation is thus ‘a
generic potentiality’: katargein does not destroy what is, but rather returns what is
actualized to its original, generic potentiality for use. This, for Agamben, is the ‘new
creature’ of which Paul speaks in 2 Corinthians 5:17. These dense phrases bring us to
the core of Agamben’s reading of Paul, and probably to his philosophy as such.47
(3) Charis. This analysis of chrēsis is mirrored in Agamben’s analysis of charis or
grace. In light of our quest to capture the particular dialectics of the exception at work
in Paul’s letters, it is once more helpful to discuss Agamben’s conception of grace in
light of Badiou’s one. For the latter, the term of grace belongs on the same level as the
event. For the subject, grace is nothing but the grace of the path of the spirit, of life, and
of faith. In this sense, grace ﬁts perfectly in the conception of the Two of the subject and
the two paths that go hand in hand with it. Agamben, however, argues that grace is a
more complicated term that one should understand out of Paul’s particular conception
of the diﬀerence between pistis and nomos, between faith and law. So, let us brieﬂy
follow Agamben’s analysis of this relation and subsequently address its speciﬁc sig-
niﬁcance for the main line of inquiry, which is the dialectics of the exception we aim to
ﬁnd in Paul.
For Agamben, it is not a given that pistis and nomos are separated.48 In fact, if one
considers Paul’s considerations about the covenant or pact of God with his people, it is
obvious that such a legal-like construction does not function without a reference to
pistis: the pact depends on the trustworthiness of, ﬁrst, God and, second, the people. In
this sense, one might argue that trustworthiness and pact, pistis and nomos, go hand in
hand in the original covenant made with Abraham: they do not only not exist without
each other but are also intrinsically mixed up with each other. It is only later, in the
articulation of a proper law in the commandments, represented for Paul by the ﬁgure of
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Moses, that a distinction can be made and that the trustworthiness of the people is
transformed into obedience to the law. By proclaiming the crisis of the law – nobody is
capable of obeying the law – Paul interferes in this original co-belonging of pistis and
nomos and takes them apart, as Agamben argues. Paul’s retrieves of the covenant of
God and Abraham as being more original than the covenant of God with Moses. In this
way, he shows how pistis – and not the nomos of Moses’ commandments – is
constitutive of the original covenant.49 Hence, Paul’s analysis indeed introduces an
opposition. Yet, where does this opposition leave us? According to Agamben, and one
might read this is an implicit critique of Badiou who tends to leave law and faith in
their opposition, this opposition only marks the beginning of Paul’s thought of faith
and law. Since pistis and nomos were not always opposed but rather intrinsically
connected and mixed up, the opposition is not the last word about their relation, but
only Paul’s rhetoric point of departure, as Agamben writes: ‘It is not a matter of
opposing two heterogeneous principles and excluding works in favor of faith, but of
coming to terms with the aporia that emerges from this rupture.’50 In the letter to the
Romans, Paul proclaims the crisis of the law when stating that the law has become
unobservable. This crisis grows into a fracture of pistis and nomos (Rom. 3, 4) but this
fracture discloses another term responding to this aporia and reconnecting or mediat-
ing faith and law. This mediating, third term is grace. Grace, according to Agamben, is
the name for the exceptional and excessive nature of faith. These two adjectives,
exceptional and excessive, need to be understood out of the original relation of faith
and law. Faith, and its promise of trustworthiness, can never be completely fulﬁlled in
or as counterservice, as Agamben writes:
The promise exceeds any claim that could supposedly ground itself in it, just as faith
surpasses any obligation whatsoever of counterservice. Grace is that excess which, while it
always divides the two elements of prelaw and prevents them from coinciding, does not
even allow them to completely break apart.51
As use (chrēsis) is the third term in relation in the ‘as not’ (hōs mē), grace is the third
term between faith and law that describes their dialectic relation: it not only ‘prevents
them from coinciding’ but also ‘does not … allow them to completely break apart.’ To
do justice to this excess of faith, another conception of the covenant is necessary for
Paul, not as a newly written covenant, but in particular forms of life, as Agamben
insists, referring to the passage in which Paul describes the Corinthians as his written
letter (2 Cor. 3:2). This means that grace is not opposed to good works, but grants a
certain autarcheia to the capacity to do good works (in reference to 2 Cor. 9:7–8):
What should be obvious is that autarkeia does not signify a suﬃcient disposition of goods
(as some translations suggest), but the sovereign capacity to gratuitously carry out good
works independently of the law.52
Thus, the capacity to do good works is no longer anchored in a written law that
obligates but in a ‘sovereign capacity.’ Perhaps, one might capture the diﬀerence
between Schmitt’s sense of sovereignty and the one Agamben ﬁnds here in Paul, as
follows. For Schmitt, the sovereign is the one who has the power to proclaim the state of
exception. This suspension of the law opens up a realm of decisionism: the decisional
power of the sovereign is all that is left when the law is suspended. For Paul, however,
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the suspension of the law opens up the original sphere that made the law possible in the
ﬁrst place and of which the law is the expression, namely the sphere of promise of
righteousness (and not of power or decision alone).53 Grace is, for Paul, nothing but
this promise of righteousness. At this point, the similarity and the diﬀerence between
Agamben and Badiou is once more seen very clearly: whereas for Badiou, the law is
simply the opposite of the (righteous) event, for Agamben the law is dialectically related
to righteousness as its source.
Therefore, as Agamben suggests, the notion of grace is intrinsically connected to that
of use, as Agamben suggests in the next quote:
[Grace] manifests itself as an irreducible excess with regard to all obligatory service. Grace
does not provide the foundation for exchange and social obligations; it makes for their
interruption … grace entails nothing more than the ability to use the sphere of social
determinations and services in its totality.54
Both grace and use are notions that carry the weight of the exception to a logic reigned
by identity, vocation, exchange, and social order. In this sense, grace and use both
express a particular nonconformity, but they do so in relation to the present order of
the world which they interrupt and deactivate only insofar as this order posits itself as
absolute. Here, one might say, the exception and the exceptional status of both grace
and use are indeed the consequence of a dialectical battle of the order with these
exceptions – and, indeed, given the original inspiration of the law to express and give
form to justice and righteousness, it might even become comprehensible why, para-
phrasing Kierkegaard’s reﬂection on the exception in Repetition, this order, despite its
struggle with the exception since it does not want to allow an exception, will ultimately
rejoice over its exceptions.
4. Concluding remarks: on what it is to be nothing
To conclude, let me return to the problem of the Gnostic temptation in Paul and the
question of whether the philosophers today indeed emphasize Paul’s meontology.
Where do we stand with respect to these issues? Let me once more quote Critchley,
from whom I have taken the term ‘meontology.’ He speaks of the double declaration of
nothingness we ﬁnd in Paul:
This discloses a peculiar double logic: in proclaiming faith and enacting life, the world
becomes trash and we become the trash of the world. The waiting community becomes the
unwanted oﬀscouring that is seen as garbage by the lights of Greek wisdom and sees, in
turn, the existing communal world as garbage.55
According to Critchley, there is a mutual proclamation of nothingness, indicating the
mutual exclusion of the realms of faith and law, of spirit and ﬂesh, and of life and death.
Critchley, however, does not address the dialectical relation of this doubled nothing-
ness, and therefore for him this is yet another example of the fundamental meontology
operative in those parts of Paul’s letters emphasized by the philosophers. Yet, as I have
aimed to show, this mutual proclamation has to be understood in light of a particular
logic. To be nothing can take on diﬀerent meanings. To be nothing in the present order
of the world refers to the denial of the possibility of the exception and of grace. The
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world’s being nothing, however, refers not to such a denial but rather to faith’s
indiﬀerence to what is something in the world – this is not a nihilism but simply
means that the valuation attached to, for instance, wealth and power in Roman
discourse or to circumcision in Jewish discourse are not aﬃrmed, but rather suspended
so that they can be used freely: freed from the law, these particular properties do not
need to be annihilated, but are given free for a good usage. This is the very meaning of
grace, as Agamben notes. The ‘capacity to gratuitously carry out good works indepen-
dently of the law,’ simply means that good works can also be carried out beyond the
commandments – exactly in those cases in which the commandment is at odds with
justice and righteousness, this capacity is indeed the pure grace of the presence of
justice. In this sense, as Agamben also notes, ‘grace entails nothing more than the ability
to use the sphere of social determinations and services in its totality’ and thus oﬀers the
possibility to value even what the world considers to be worthless.
To claim that this is a nihilism or attests to a meontology is to mistake a Gnostic
temptation in Paul for a Gnostic interpretation of Paul. Although Taubes has shown
that this mistake has often been made, I hope to have shown that Agamben and Badiou
are, as Taubes, aware of this diﬀerence between temptation and interpretation. In the
dialectic usages of negation and nothingness in Paul, a suspension does not reduce to
nothing what is suspended but makes it free for another usage or interpretation. As we
have seen, Paul’s notions of spirit, grace, and use are fundamental in this regard since
they make up the very exception. They are the terms, as Agamben argues, that mediate
what in any dualism or nihilism remains mutually exclusive.
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usage of the Pauline phrase ‘Jew nor Greek’ to exemplify the exception as universal, that
Badiou does not say that the form of subjectivity introduced by the event is an abstract
universality – every concrete subject is divided and is, on the one hand grounded in one
of the discourses and on the other hand called to go beyond this discourse (or rather,
beyond discourses of particularity as such). In this sense, the divided subject that Badiou
introduces might indeed be closer to Agamben’s ‘non-non Jew’ than the latter is willing
to acknowledge, see Agamben, The Time That Remains, 51. I will discuss this more
extensively below.
21. Badiou, Saint Paul, 63.
22. ibid, 74.
23. See, e.g. Derrida, Marges de La philosophie, I.
24. For another reference to spirit in terms of such a path of the subject, see Badiou, Saint
Paul, 82–3.
25. Badiou, Saint Paul, 63.
26. ibid, 66.
27. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 227.
28. It would be interesting andworthwhile to extend this analysis and comparisonwithKierkegaard
as a mediating thinker between Hegel and Badiou when it comes to the question of dialectics.
Note that Kierkegaard insists on an ambiguity on the side of the universal as well as of the
exception. On the universal, he notes: ‘the struggle itself is a strange conﬂict between the rage
and impatience of the universal over the disturbance the exception causes and its infatuated
partiality for the exception, for after all is said and done, just as heaven rejoices more over a
sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous, so does the universal rejoice over an
exception.’ Thus, on the one hand, the universal is frustrated that the exception resists the
universal’s application to it, but on the other hand, the universal is marked by an ‘infatuated
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partiality for the exception,’ thus suggesting that the universal exists so that the exception may
manifest itself. On the exception, he notes: ‘the insubordination and deﬁance of the exception,
his weakness and inﬁrmity.’ Hence, the exception is not only perseverance in resistance but is
also weakness and inﬁrmity and needs the universal to become stronger as universal. In these
remarks it is not diﬃcult to see the sense of Badiou’s subject as a Two preﬁgured: The subject is,
as ﬁdelity, always also a ﬁght with and against the other path. As Kierkegaard continues: ‘The
whole thing is a wrestlingmatch in which the universal breaks with the exception, wrestles with
him in conﬂict, and strengthens him through this wrestling. … The vigorous and determined
exception, who although he is in conﬂict with the universal still is an oﬀshoot of it, sustains
himself.’ For all quotes, see Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 226–27.
29. Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 4; see also 45, 299.
30. See Badiou, ‘From Logic to Anthropology,’ esp. 45–8. I would like to thank one of the
referees for pointing this reference out to me. As Badiou writes at 47: ‘So, this logic is
actually non-dialectical – in Hegel’s and Marx’s sense – since it does not start with the
creativity of negation as such, though the site of negativity is certainly included in the
consequences of something which is aﬃrmative.’
31. ‘So when I say that there is something non-dialectical, whether with regard to Paul or to
the ﬁeld of concrete political analysis, I am putting forward the same idea formally
speaking. We have to try to understand the exact conditions under which we are able
to have something like a possibility of concrete negation. And this can only be achieved, it
seems to me, in the ﬁeld of primitive aﬃrmation, through something that is primitively
aﬃrmative and not negative. To use my own terminology: it is a question of event and
subject’ (Badiou, ‘From Logic to Anthropology,’ 46–7).
32. Badiou, ‘From Logic to Anthropology,’ 48.
33. Cf. also the ‘dialectic of the subject’ (Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 497).
34. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 65–6; Agamben, Homo Sacer, 16.
35. Let me emphasize that I limit myself here to the themes that directly respond to what I
discussed in relation to Badiou. There are, of course, more extensive accounts possible of
both the sense of dialectics and the sense of the exception in relation to Agamben. I have
done so elsewhere, cf. Van der Heiden, ‘Paul’s Dialectic in Present-Day Philosophy.’
36. Although, Agamben does refer to 1 Cor. 1:28 (cf. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 10),
he does not refer to this text when explicating the meaning and impact of the verb
katargein in reﬂection on this verse, cf. especially 93–107.
37. The importance of this notion of katargein thus stretches out to the notion of inoper-
ativity, which is a core concept of Agamben’s work. Even in the last book of the Homo
Sacer-series, The Use of Bodies, he returns to this notion and to its Pauline origin and
shows its proximity with the notion of destituent power that plays a fundamental role in
it, see Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 273–74.
38. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 96.
39. ibid, 99.
40. ibid, 100.
41. For the discussion of vocation or klētos, see Agamben, The Time That Remains, 19–43. It
is also in this context that the notion of chrēsis is ﬁrst introduced.
42. Here, I will be limiting my discussion to The Time That Remains. Yet, to see the impact
and the importance of Paul’s notion of chrēsis for Agamben’s work as a whole, one should
note that the notion of use plays a central role well beyond the conﬁnes of this book. At
least two other works deserve to be mentioned. In The Highest Poverty, Agamben shows
how in the Franciscan order this sense of use is opposed to the sense of right and
property or ownership and concerns the form of life that is at stake in the monastery.
Also here, Agamben traces this sense of use and form of life back to 1 Corinthians
7:20–31, which is also the crucial passage in The Time That Remains. ‘What is lacking in
the Franciscan literature is a deﬁnition of use in itself and not only in opposition to law.
The preoccupation with constructing a justiﬁcation of use in juridical terms prevented
them from collecting the hints of a theory of use present in the Pauline letters, in
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 187
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
7:3
2 2
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
particular in 1 Corinthians 7:20–31, in which using the world as not using it or not
abusing it (et qui utuntur hoc mundo, tamquam non utantur; the original Greek hōs mē
katachromenoi means “as not abusing”) deﬁned the Christian’s form of life’ (Agamben,
The Highest Poverty, 139). In his recent The Use of Bodies, he reminds the readers of the
same passages and the same problem of ownership, see Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 56–
7. It would be a worthwhile task in itself to pursue the diﬀerent senses of this notion.
Here, however, I will limit myself to explore the dialectic status of chrēsis and to show
how it can be read as an intervention in Badiou’s reading of Paul.
43. For Agamben’s interpretation of Paul’s hōs mē as a tensor, cf. Agamben, The Time That
Remains, 23–5.
44. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 26.
45. Critchley does not discuss this dimension of the hōs mē in Agamben’s interpretation and
is therefore bound to identify this ‘as not’-structure with Paul’s meontology, even though
he does quote 1 Cor. 7:21, which is one of the passages in which chrēsis does not only
appear but to which Agamben actually refers to introduces his account of chrēsis, cf.
Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless, 177–80; Agamben, The Time That Remains, 26.
Perhaps one can say that the question of meontology is the point of departure for these
discussions because of the widely acknowledged Gnostic temptation in Paul, but it cannot
be the end point.
46. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 26.
47. One could further explore this diﬀerence in terms of the relation of the event and division of
the subject in Badiou and compare this to Agamben’s emphasis not so much on the question
of universality but of the determination of this universality in terms of the theme of
separation (aphōrismenos) and its consequences for the notions of the part, the all and the
remnant in Paul, cf. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 44–58. This analysis would allow
one to clarify the strange occurrence that the notion of the exception does not only enter
Badiou’s text to think the universal and the event but also to characterize the Jewish
discourse and its emphasis on the exception and the election (Badiou, Saint Paul, 41–2,
56–7). Badiou does not reﬂect on the relation between these two forms of exception because,
for him, the exception constituted by the grace of the event is pure indiﬀerence to Jewish
discourse. Against this background, Agamben’s inquiry into Paul’s account of separation
and election shows that for Paul, the theme of election is taken from Jewish discourse but
also transformed and returns in the form of the important theme of the remnant, that which
becomes visible when the Jewish discourse is rendered inoperative. Moreover, and it is
important to note that, this does not mean that Agamben simply rejects the idea of
universality that Badiou invokes – after all, the remnant and the revocation of all vocations
is a possibility for all – but he does show the complexity of this notion and shows that it
cannot be thought in terms of pure indiﬀerence to Jewish discourse alone, but should rather
be understood as a free (universal) use of the terminology Jewish discourse oﬀers.
48. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 116–19.
49. The diﬀerent roles of Abraham and Moses are understood by Agamben in terms of (or
perhaps as anticipation of) what Schmitt describes as the diﬀerence between the consti-
tuting power (in this case of pact and trustworthiness) and the constituted power (in this
case of the commandments); Agamben, The Time That Remains, 118.
50. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 119.
51. ibid, 120.
52. ibid, 121.
53. The relation of power – or the force – of law and the righteousness or justice of the law
obviously deserves further explication, but would lead us beyond the scope of this article.
At this point, a discussion between Agamben’s Paul and Derrida’s work in Force de loi
promises an important contribution.
54. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 124.
55. Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless, 176.
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